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With reference to two journals written by women hospitalized with 
psychotic disorders and subsequently published (Hart, 1997; Jefferson, 
1975), I examine the role of writing in the context of acute ‘mental 
illness’.1 In particular, I suggest that simply recording the everyday may 
help psychotic patients to (re)fashion a coherent sense of selfhood. 
 
 
Madness and Identity 
 
A feature common to the multifarious conditions grouped under the 
designation of ‘mental illness’ is the disruption of a coherent sense of selfhood: 
in the midst of disturbance the very foundations of personality seem to shift, 
mutate, even disaggregate entirely. This phenomenon has been widely 
observed and recorded by both clinicians and ‘patients’. In the mainstream of 
psychiatric opinion it is axiomatic that the psychological process known as 
dissociation, which involves troubling alterations in the sense of self, is 
common to a wide range of psychological disorders and is particularly acute in 
cases of psychosis (see Saxe et al., 1993; van der Kolk, 1995; Bleuler, 1966; 
Jaspers, 1962; Freeman et al., 1958; Federn, 1952; Fabrega, 1989; Helmsley, 
1998). Notwithstanding disagreements over aetiology, commentators from the 
more critical fringes of the human sciences and the humanities concur. Thus 
David Mann (1991: 216) insists that “psychiatric ailments […] can be 
understood as losses of self”; Robert Young (1995: para 28) comments that, for 
the psychotic, “fragmentation of self becomes the norm”; James Glass (1993: 
27) writes of the shattering of a “core sense of self”; and Marta Caminero-
Santangelo (1998: 103) describes “the absolute powerlessness of one who 
cannot completely claim the ‘I’ for herself”. 
 Those deemed mad commonly reiterate such assessments. Lara Jefferson 
(1975: 24-5) describes madness as a “flood […] swirling about me […] 
sucking me under”, lamenting that: “There is only a shadow remaining of the 
person I used to be” (ibid: 19); while Linda Hart (1997: 14) describes her 
psychosis – manifest as auditory hallucinations of the hostile voice of her dead 
father – as “closing me down and taking me away from the world”. For Hart 





this closure of selfhood is linked to a muting of her own voice and a felt loss of 
agency: “Today my father has attempted to get control of my mind. He does it 
by subtle means. Taking away my speech, closing me down and taking me 
away from the world”. Moreover, the voice repeatedly urges her to kill herself, 
and conjures up images of death, decay, and absence. When Hart records that, 
“his voice became more insistent. He told me my skin was coming off and that 
I could disappear” (p.33), madness manifests as an impression of bodily 
disintegration – a powerful image of the nullification of the self. 
 My argument is that by means of writing – and specifically in their records 
of the everyday – Hart and Jefferson are actively reforming their fragile senses 
of selfhood. This is not, however, immediately apparent. Hart’s text, in 
particular, is a fairly mundane record of everyday life on the hospital ward: 
descriptions of interactions with friends and relatives who visit, and 
conversations with nurses and doctors. Although (quite briefly) recording 
episodes of distress, there is very little psychological analysis or revisiting of 
the past. While Jefferson’s text is more self-consciously literary and addresses 
the dynamics of writing in the context of severe distress more explicitly, it too 
is overwhelmingly preoccupied with the everyday and concentrates on the lives 
of fellow patients rather than her own. 
 Notwithstanding their journals’ contents, both writers attribute 
dramatically beneficial effects to their writing. In one of Hart’s final entries, 
and on the day before she returns to work, she declares: “Writing this journal 
has kept me on the edge of sanity. Without it, I believe I would have tipped 
over into the chasm of madness from where I could not be reached” (352-3). 
Jefferson describes her diary as a “ladder of words – strong enough, and long 
enough – to reach out of this” (112), and specifically links her continued 
existence to writing: 
 
The flood that was swirling about me was sucking me under – and the pencil I had 
in my hand was a straw to be caught. It was just a straw – but I caught it – and 
now I have kept my head above water for a while. (24-5) 
 
At the end of her journal, shortly before she is transferred to an open ward, 
Jefferson also declares that writing has been instrumental in her recovery: “I 
kept writing in an effort to escape [madness] […] I have sat through floods of 
raving and built a barrier – a breakwater of small black words around me” 
(236). 
 What is it, then, about their diaries which prompts Hart and Jefferson to 
denote them as key factors in recovery? On one level, it is not difficult to see 
how asserting a ‘voice’ in the context of a journal might alleviate the erosion of 
voice which Hart describes as concomitant with psychosis. That is, in the diary 
the ‘voice’ on the page is perhaps more identifiably the writer’s, rather than 
emanating from an external source. To write, therefore, may be to counter 




voicelessness. However, it is less obvious how through writing, and through a 
writing which rarely attempts to ‘understand’ the self, or to delve into 
psychological history, one might – to any significant degree – reform a 
shattered identity. How can, in Hart’s case, recording one’s meals, the weather, 
the names and occupations of those one is hospitalized with, one’s occasional 
trips out at weekends, affect something as fundamental as identity? 
 To attempt to answer this, I want to turn first to that strand of theory which 
challenges notions of the self as transcendental essence, and instead posits 
‘identity’ as an effect of language. An influential example is Emile 
Benveniste’s Problems in General Linguistics, in which he claims that it is 
through using language, through speaking, that we establish what we recognize 
as human identity. Thus, he argues that “it is in and through language that man 
constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the concept 
of ‘ego’”, and, famously, that “subjectivity is only the emergence in the being 
of a fundamental property of language. ‘Ego’ is he who says ‘ego’” (1971: 
224). 
 For Benveniste, therefore, verbal expression doesn’t express what is there 
anyway. Rather, in Anthony Kerby’s summary, expression “generates the 
subject […] presupposed by it”: “the disclosive power of language is formative 
of the subject” (Kerby , 1991: 74 and 82). And, particularly germane to my 
discussion here, Kerby notes that “soliloquy” – talking to yourself – “is 
especially important to the question of self-identity” (ibid: 72). 
 Benveniste’s ideas presage less abstract work in psychology and 
neuroscience undertaken on the role of self-talk. The neuropsychologist Alain 
Morin, for example, has written extensively about how our sense of self is 
related to ‘inner speech’ – the process by which we speak to ourselves in our 
own heads (see Morin, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2003). He contends that the self 
forms a “coherent picture of what it is” by “talking to itself about itself”, and 
that inner speech is critical for the development of self-awareness – which is 
not only dependent upon but “almost synonymous with our ‘inner voice’” 
(Morin and Everett, 1990: 341). 
 On alleviating mental distress, Morin and Everett (1990: 351) suggest that 
“low self-conscious subjects” might be taught “to talk to themselves about 
themselves”, and note that “when irrealist cognitions are at the core of clients’ 
problems, introspective self-talk could be learned to identify and change 
maladaptive self-talk”. In a similar vein, the neuroscientist Bernard Baars 
(1997: 77) describes schizophrenia as an inner speech “that has run out of 
control”, and suggests that a possible treatment might be to “teach 
schizophrenics to speak to themselves in different voices, at will, to regain 
control over the inner voice”. 
 My suggestion is that the journals of Hart and Jefferson are examples of 
such an exercise in soliloquizing. And this is obviously significant if through 
self-talk they are also – to follow Benveniste and Morin – constructing 





themselves as ‘selves’; agents who can act and can speak, rather than be acted 
on, and ‘spoken’, by psychosis. If madness is intimately bound up with the 
dissolution of the self, then to strengthen a sense of selfhood may also be to 
attenuate madness. Psychiatrists Larry Davidson and John Strauss (1992: 131) 
have addressed this point, claiming that “an enhanced sense of self” can help 
sufferers by providing them with a “refuge from their illness” and a 
“foundation upon which they may then take up the work of recovery in a more 
active […] fashion”. 
 There are two points to emphasize here. Firstly, I am invoking self-talk as a 
process by which the self, in a willed and self-conscious movement separates 
itself from the flux of existence and speaks to itself – and which here is 
externalized in textual form. Secondly, the way that these diaries reclaim 
selfhood is not (only or primarily) by telling stories, by establishing a narrative. 
Rather, identity is primarily established by means of assuming the subject 
position of an ‘I’, simply by speaking/writing as an ‘I’, or to adapt Benveniste: 
ego is she who says ego. 
 On this last point, it is obviously true that speaking in and as an ‘I’ is a part 
of most personal speech. But what is happening in these texts is, I think, subtly 
different from what we might call ‘everyday speech’: this is why I have 
highlighted self-awareness and will. Baars (1997: 131) hints at this when he 
emphasizes teaching schizophrenics to speak to themselves at will, and when 
he points out that experientially there is a major difference between “very 
similar voluntary and nonvoluntary actions”. But to elucidate this point in more 
detail I want to return to the more abstract realm of theory – specifically 
Maurice Blanchot’s essay ‘Everyday Speech’. 
 Blanchot’s purpose in this essay is to redeem the quotidian from its tainted 
status as an unexamined and hence unlived existence (after Socrates’ maxim) 
by indicating, and to an extent celebrating, its subversive undercutting of 
comforting illusions of self-presence and ideals such as value and judgement – 
“the everyday […] designates […] a region or a level of speech where the 
determinations true and false, like the opposition of yes and no, do not apply” 
(Blanchot, 1993: 242). For Blanchot, everyday speech represents “an 
unspeaking speech that is the soft human murmuring in us and around us”; and 
includes ‘unwilled’ semi-conscious un-decided-upon speech/thought. In 
normal life, he contends, the “everyday escapes” because it “is without a 
subject” (ibid, 244). That is, everyday (inner and outer) speech is typically 
absentminded and unaware of itself: in this realm of everyday speech/thought 
we are barely conscious of ourselves as selves. Blanchot claims that everyday 
speech tends to be feared as it represents “the power of dissolution”: the 
forgetful unaware state of everyday speech is the antithesis of the fortress-like 
ego which bolsters itself by excluding and denying otherness. 
 However, Blanchot notes that potential dangers lurk in the realm of 
everyday speech, and these are, I suggest, particularly important to consider in 




the context of mental disturbance. He points out that because the “day-to-day 
indifference” of the everyday “cannot be assumed by a true subject (even 
putting into question the notion of a subject)”, it “tends unerringly to weigh 
down into things”, and is a medium in which “alienations, fetishisms, and 
reifications” may flourish because of the lack of an engaged awareness to resist 
and divide the unconstrained flow of impressions (245). Moreover, the 
individual labouring in a monotonous existence who has only the everyday is 
“he for whom the everyday is most heavy” (244). 
 For Hart, the ‘fetishisms’ of everyday speech include the virulent antipathy 
and ceaseless murmur of her internalized father: subsumed by this, she is in 
danger of complete capitulation to an unbearable everyday comprised of 
hostility and fear, or as she puts it lost in a “chasm of madness”. Deprived of a 
coherent ‘I’, the psychotic is akin to a character trapped in a nightmarish 
fiction without a narrator. So while Blanchot’s aim is to challenge discourses 
which valorize the atomised sovereign self, for the psychotic the dissolution of 
a strong sense of self is already a lived reality, and is manifest as suffering. 
There is little danger – or even possibility – that those who have such intimate 
knowledge of the radical contingency of the ‘I’ could ever retreat behind the 
ramparts of a fort-like ego. 
 Although these diaries speak of the everyday, they are not, therefore, 
everyday speech as Blanchot describes it; rather, they represent its inverse – 
self-aware embarkations into language. Moreover, in my estimation they are 
willed linguistic constructions of selfhood; the strategy which is of most 
importance in these texts is the conscious formulation of simple sentences in 
which ‘I’ assumes the place of subject, or which, having assumed that placing, 
describes and comments on existence. Thus, for instance, this seemingly 
unremarkable entry by Hart (1997: 11): “I haven’t yet had eye contact with 
Pam. She wears the same clothes each day and night and her black hair gets 
more and more greasy”. Here, as Benveniste might have it, by taking up the 
position of the first person, a position from which a self might be articulated is 
also taken up. A sense of selfhood, or even the possibility of selfhood, is thus 
established which enables Hart to look outside herself from that position. In the 
context of a psychosis which has effectively closed Hart down as an agent, 
saying ‘I’ in this willed and conscious way is significant. 
 This dynamic can be further illumined with reference to Lev Vygotsky’s 
influential theory of the development of ‘inner speech’. True inner speech, 
Vygotsky contends, is characterized by abbreviation. That is, we tend to speak 
inwardly to ourselves in a very shortened form, and not as if we were speaking 
to someone else. This is because: “We know what we are thinking about; ie. we 
always know the subject and the situation. And since the subject of our inner 
dialogue is already known we may just imply it” (Vygotsky, 1986: 243). Even 
disregarding their written form, then, these grammatically coherent diaries do 
not conform to a Vygotskian model of inner speech. Yet Vygotsky’s 





prerequisite for the functioning of inner speech – of ‘always knowing what we 
are thinking about’ – can hardly be said to apply to the being-states described 
in Hart’s and Jefferson’s journals. In their accounts, they do not know and 
cannot predict the direction of their thinking because their thoughts seem to 
come from outside. Moreover, abbreviated inner speech may be an unattractive 
modality for the psychotic in that its gaps and ellipses may present openings 
for the irruptions of psychotic forms of thought to ‘enter’ and colonize the self. 
There are resonances here, it seems to me, with Blanchot’s notion of the 
reifications and fetishisms flourishing in the realm of everyday speech. 
 The journals do evoke, however, the developmental precursor to inner 
speech, which Vygotsky calls (after Piaget) ‘egocentric speech’. This 
represents a transitional stage between speaking to others and inner speech, and 
occurs when the child, having mastered speaking directly to and with others, 
begins to speak aloud to itself while in the company of others. It represents a 
conversation with the self which “occurs only in a social context” in which the 
child assumes “that his egocentric talk […] is understood by those who 
surround him” (Vygotsky, 1986: 231). It “already has the function of inner 
speech”, but “remains similar to social speech in its expression” (235). 
 Significantly, a prominent motif of Hart’s and Jefferson’s journals is an 
acute awareness of others, of the social, interpersonal, and dialogic. Rather 
than extensively detailing their own symptoms, both are preoccupied with 
other people – hospital staff , other patients, friends; and in addition their texts 
take into account and allow for possible or actual readers. On this latter point, 
Hart actively plans for and allows staff and friends to read her journal, and her 
writing is spoken about by others who encourage her to publish it: before she is 
released she learns that extracts will indeed appear in a mental health journal. 
In her journal, Jefferson constructs an imaginary reader of her text or an alter 
ego and her writing often takes the form of a dialogue with this ‘other’. Far 
from a manifestation or psychosis, this is a consciously worked out strategy. At 
other moments she directly addresses an imagined reader outside the text. 
 These factors suggest to me that there may be similarities between the 
Vygotskian child practising voice and carving out linguistic territory, and the 
narrative work undertaken by Hart and Jefferson. If these adults hospitalized 
with psychosis are to practice egocentric speech, they cannot talk aloud to 
themselves without running the risk that such behaviour will be interpreted as 
pathological. So instead they write – and feasibly their texts can be read as 
written versions of egocentric speech: their writing is understandable by others; 
in their diaries they imagine others reading the texts; their texts continually 
picture others, and are read by others. 
 Morin’s and Baars’s – and Vygotsky’s – reflections may need to be 
modified slightly if they are to fit with psychotic experience. But, read in 
conjunction with the deliberations of Benveniste and Blanchot, their work aids 
an understanding of the processes and potential of journal writing in this 




context. Notably, the model of selfhood I have outlined here is not the 
atomistic, privatized “fortress-like ego” which Blanchot resists, but is 
dependent on others: the dialogue with the self – from which a meaningful 
sense of identity emerges – is formed in a socially inflected context. Most 
significantly, reading such texts through the lenses of these disparate 
discourses reveals that in these apparently mundane stories we actually witness 
the manifestation and outworking of a mode of existence, the trace and 





1. The term ‘mental illness’ can be problematic for those who live with acute 
mental distress. Generally I prefer to use ‘madness’ as the term does not so 
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